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Reforming the pension 
reforms:
Argentina and Chile
Rafael Rofman, Eduardo Fajnzylber and Germán Herrera
This article describes the most recent pension reforms in Argentina 
and Chile. The previous reforms, implemented in the 1980s and 1990s, 
aimed to improve long-term fiscal sustainability and institutional design 
of the systems, shifting part of the social and economic risks away from 
the State and on to participants. In recent years, the authorities in both 
countries identified the main problems facing current pension systems as 
inadequate coverage for older adults and the low level of benefits. The 
two countries have responded differently, however, owing to institutional 
and political divergences. In Chile, a lengthy participatory process resulted 
in a wide-ranging reform targeting medium-term effects through carefully 
calibrated adjustments. In contrast, the reforms in Argentina were made 
through a succession of corrections, with little public discussion of their 
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Having pioneered pension reform in Latin America 
in the 1980s and 1990s, Argentina and Chile have 
recently undertaken a new round of revisions and 
adjustments to their retirement systems. This article 
describes key elements of the recent reforms, explains 
why and how they were implemented and discusses 
their potential effects and remaining challenges.
Chile was the first country in the region to make 
structural reforms to its retirement pension system in 
the early 1980s, based on a funded mechanism under 
private management. Wage-earners were required to 
participate in the system, while self-employed workers 
could join on a voluntary basis. In Argentina, the 
1993 reform introduced a similar funded scheme, but 
without completely eliminating the defined-benefits/
pay-as-you-go component. The Argentine reform 
was viewed at the time as more advanced than its 
Chilean counterpart; both the design process and 
political debate, as well as various technical aspects 
of  the new system were considered sounder and 
more sustainable.1
While sharing certain design features, the 
Argentine and Chilean pension systems also suffered 
from a number of  problems in common, such as 
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1  For example, Arenas de Mesa and Bertranou (1997) claim that the 
Argentine model displayed: (a) greater inter- and intra-generational 
solidarity; (b) relatively lower transition costs payable by the State; 
(c) higher coverage of self-employed workers; (d) a better defined 
regulatory framework; and (e) fewer gender inequities. 
low coverage rates, a structure of  excessively high 
administrative costs, major uncertainty for participants 
and problems of  equity. Some of  these problems 
stemmed from macroeconomic and labour-market 
trends, whereas others were inherent in the system 
design itself.
Although many reports have been produced on 
the problems identified over the last 15 years —and 
several specific actions and small-scale reforms have 
been implemented— more fundamental reforms 
were postponed largely because of macroeconomic 
and political constraints. The more robust fiscal 
position prevailing in recent years, however, together 
with a political climate that was more amenable to 
reconsidering the role of the State, created conditions 
for proceeding with a new wave of reforms.
Although the reforms in Argentina and Chile 
over the last few years have a similar origin, the 
policy measures and processes sustaining them have 
been different, apparently reflecting institutional 
and political disparities between the two countries. 
Chile promoted public debate with widespread 
participation, to forge a broader consensus. In 
contrast, Argentina took a different course, in which 
the political process was limited, closed to debate 
and implemented through decrees or laws that were 
fast-tracked through the National Congress, thereby 
curtailing discussion on the aims, contents and effects 
of  the proposed reforms.
This article has five sections. Sections II and III 
outline the workings of the Argentine and Chilean 
retirement pension schemes up to the middle of the 
current decade, and then go on to describe and analyse 
the recent reforms, their potential repercussions and 
outstanding challenges. Section IV discusses the 
implications of the political and institutional processes, 
analysing how and why the distinctive features of policy-
making in the two countries have affected aspects of 
their recent retirement-pension policy. Lastly, section 
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1.  The Argentine retirement pension scenario 
up to 2005
The Argentine pension system is one of the oldest 
in the world, with origins dating back to the early 
years of the twentieth century. Following the creation 
of a number of occupational pension schemes, the 
system grew steadily until a major boost given by the 
Peronist government in the late 1940s triggered a rapid 
expansion of coverage. A few years later, practically all 
workers in Argentina (including wage-earners and the 
self-employed) were covered by a number of relatively 
generous partial capitalization schemes.
In the late 1960s a major reform integrated 
the various schemes into one, and the national 
government was given authority to run it. The new 
unified scheme was a pay-as-you-go mechanism with 
common parameters. Nonetheless, since the 1970s, 
the system has faced growing financial problems, and 
by the late 1980s further reform was clearly needed. 
Serious doubts regarding the fiscal sustainability 
of  the system and debates on the role of  the State 
in society resulted in a structural reform being 
introduced in 1993.
This section discusses the situation of the system 
up to the middle of the current decade, considering 
both design and operational aspects.
2.  A brief overview of the system
Following the 1993 reform, the Argentine retirement 
pension system became a multi-pillar scheme featuring 
capitalization and pay-as-you-go components, 
public and private involvement in its management 
mechanisms, and a combination of the defined-benefits 
and defined-contribution models for calculating the 
pensions actually paid to retirees.
In no way can it be claimed that the changes 
introduced at that time constituted a “definitive” 
reform. Since the original law was passed in October 
1993, some 850 new regulations on the retirement 
pension system have been approved, including 34 
laws and 135 decrees. Although many of these were 
adopted to complement the original system design, the 
tendency was clearly to make short-term corrections 
and amendments. 
The design of the Argentine retirement pension 
system in 1993 consisted of two basic pillars and a 
transition scheme.2 In the second pillar, workers could 
choose between a fund capitalization scheme with 
individual accounts managed by private commercial 
companies, and a smaller pay-as-you-go scheme 
run by the State. The most important parametric 
reforms included a higher retirement age and a longer 
contribution history needed to receive a pension. The 
reforms also abolished special regimes which, for 
various reasons, set differential retirement conditions 
for certain occupations; and they promoted the 
integration of provincial schemes into the national 
framework. Lastly a complementary non-contributory 
system provided a basic income for older adults living 
in poverty. 
3.  recent trends
Following the 1993 reform, the Argentine pension 
system evolved closely in line with the macroeconomic 
trends prevailing in the country. The steady deterioration 
of labour-market conditions in the 1990s meant that 
fewer workers contributed to the system; the number 
of beneficiaries also shrank (although the older adult 
population was expanding rapidly); and the value 
of pension benefits remained broadly fixed. Pension 
assets collapsed in real terms in the 2001-2002 crisis, 
but have since been staging a recovery. The fiscal 
scenario was reflected in the trend of  retirement 
pension benefits, because the average pension asset 
is the key determinant of the financial balance of the 
public system. Lastly, the financial situation of the 
capitalization scheme behaved extremely erratical, 
as a result of  the economic and financial crisis in 
the first few years of the new century and various 
regulatory adjustments. 
Argentina has maintained one of the region’s 
highest levels of  pension coverage throughout its 
history. Nonetheless, since the 1980s, as unemployment 
and informality began to spread, pension coverage 
started to retreat. Figure 1 shows that the proportion 
2  For a detailed discussion of  its characteristics, see Rofman 
(2003).
II
The reforms in Argentina 
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of employed workers covered by the system dropped 
from 50% in the early 1990s to under 40% by 2003.3 
Once the worst of  the crisis had passed, coverage 
started to grow again, and by 2006 it was approaching 
late-1990s levels. Nonetheless, these coverage trends 
did not affect the various social groups equally. While 
the general deterioration in coverage in the 1990s did 
not affect the higher-income segment even at the height 
the crisis, it was catastrophic for the lowest income 
quintile, which suffered a drastic 40 percentage-point 
fall in coverage levels between 1992 and 2003. Since 
then it has regained just five percentage points. 
While the coverage of active workers declined 
sharply in the 1990s, the impact on the coverage of 
older adults was slower. The relatively low contribution 
density of many workers (a study using 2002 data 
shows that most active workers in Argentina had 
fragmented and incomplete contribution histories, 
implying potential exclusion from future pension 
benefits), together with regulatory changes introduced 
in the 1990s, were the main determinants of  this 
3  Information on the coverage of pension fund assets in Argentina 
does not include the share pertaining to self-employed workers, so 
the coverage rates quoted for economically active and employed 
persons understate the true figures.
(Farall and others, 2003). A lengthening of  the 
required contributions period to 30 years, in a clearly 
weakening labour market, affected many workers who 
were close to retirement. Consequently, the number 
of retirees under the national system fell from 2.1 
million in late 1992 to 1.6 million in 2005. 
In Argentina, for every 100 individuals over 65 
years of age, roughly 80 were receiving a pension in 
1992; but this proportion declined slowly to reach 68% 
by 2003. Moreover, the reduction was not distributed 
evenly across income levels, but affected the poorest 
groups much more acutely. While older adults in the 
wealthiest sectors of the population did not suffer 
any significant change, the coverage of the poorest 
quintile fell from 63% in 1992 to a low of 38% in 
2003 (see figure 2). 
As figure 3 shows, the trend of pension fund 
assets was more stable in the 1990s. The average asset 
level rose slowly, but the minimum pension remained 
unchanged. After a sharp decline in the real value 
of pension benefits caused by the inflationary shock 
of  2002, the Government pursued an aggressive 
policy to raise the minimum pension. In 2003 this 
had already recovered its previous average values in 
real terms, and by the end of 2006 it was 65% above 
its level of five years earlier. In contrast, other assets 
FIGURE 1
Coverage of the economically active, employed, 
and wage-earning populations, 1992-2009
(Percentages) 
Source: Rafael Rofman, Leonardo Lucchetti and Guzmán Ourens, “Pension systems in Latin America: concepts and measurements 
of  coverage”, sp Discussion Paper, No. 0616, Washington, D.C., World Bank, 2009; National Institute of  Statistics and Censuses 
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FIGURE 2
Coverage of the older adult population: total and by income quintile, 1992-2009
FIGURE 3 
Average and minimum benefits, and percentage of beneficiaries receiving minimum 
benefits, 1994-2008
Source: Rafael Rofman, Leonardo Lucchetti and Guzmán Ourens, “Pension systems in Latin America: concepts and measurements 
of  coverage”, sp Discussion Paper, No. 0616, Washington, D.C., World Bank, 2009; National Institute of  Statistics and Censuses 
(indec), Continuous Permanent Household Survey. First semester 2009, Buenos Aires, 2009.
Source: Juan Martin Moreno, “Se acuerda, abuelo, cuando las jubilaciones en Argentina eran Bismarckianas?”, paper presented at 
the IXth Argentine Seminar on Population Studies, 2007; Administración Nacional de la Seguridad Social (anses), Social Security 
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were only adjusted slightly, such that in late 2006 the 
value of the minimum asset was 83% of the average. 
Consequently, about 75% of  system beneficiaries 
receive the minimum pension.
Figure 4 shows the trend of pension expenditure 
since the 1980s. The very sharp increase between the 
mid-1980s and early 1990s reflects government efforts 
to promote reform at that time. Once the new system 
was approved, total expenditure stopped growing and 
then dropped sharply in the wake of the 2001-2002 
crisis and the freezing of assets until 2005. Since then, 
pension fund assets have recovered and coverage has 
expanded, and by 2008 expenditure was at levels close 
to the highs of the early 1990s.
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4. recent reforms and their potential impacts
Taken as a whole, the pension reforms recently 
implemented in Argentina aim to change the coverage 
and level of benefits provided by the system, along 
with its fiscal parameters, the roles played by the State 
and the private sector in managing the system, and 
also a number of regulatory aspects of the private 
scheme. The reforms were implemented through various 
legal instruments, including several decrees, laws and 
regulations. The main laws were Nos. 26222, passed 
on 27 February 2007; 26417, passed on 1 October 
2008; and 26425, passed on 4 December 2008. In some 
cases, these regulations affect the provisions of earlier 
reforms. This section describes each of the changes 
in greater detail, and, where possible, estimates the 
expected short- and medium-term effects. 
(a) Coverage
Affiliation reforms for active workers 
Since the start of the decade, various amendments 
led to a progressive transfer of  workers from the 
capitalization system to the pay-as-you-go scheme. The 
first sign of this trend was the restoration of special 
pension regimes for teachers, researchers, diplomats 
and justice officials — which had been abolished by 
decree in 1994, but had been a permanent source of 
litigation ever since. In 2001, the authorities restored 
the special scheme for diplomats and then did the same 
successively for the other regimes, so that by March 
2005, the four programmes mentioned above were 
operating once again. In May 2007, it was decided 
that workers belonging to those regimes would have 
to pay their contributions into the public pay-as-
you-go scheme, and roughly 174,000 contributors 
(1.5% of total affiliates in the capitalization system at 
that time) were transferred as a result of that ruling 
(safjp, 2007). 
A second group of active workers who transferred 
to the pay-as-you-go system were individuals over 
50 years of age (men) or 55 (women) who had less 
than $ 20,000 in their individual accounts. Law 26222 
provided that those workers would be transferred to the 
pay-as-you-go system, unless they explicitly stated their 
desire to remain in the capitalization scheme. Between 
July 2007 and March 2008, about 1.1 million affiliates 
were transferred under this law, representing nearly 
10% of all affiliates of the individual capitalization 
system (although no official information is available 
on how many of those affiliates actually made regular 
contributions to their accounts). The same law made 
it possible for workers to request transfer from one 
system to the other every five years, and provided 
that the first period in which that option could be 
FIGURE 4
Pension expenditure as a percentage of gdp, by jurisdiction 1980-2008
Source: Ministry of  Economy and Public Finance (mecon), “Series de gasto público consolidado”, Buenos Aires, 2009.
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exercised would last until December 2007. During 
those months, nearly 1.3 million affiliates chose to 
switch from the individual capitalization system to 
the public pay-as-you-go system. 
These three measures jointly meant that about 
2.5 million affiliates of the capitalization system (21% 
of total affiliates in late 2006) transferred to the pay-
as-you-go system in early 2008. Many of them may 
have had highly fragmented contribution histories, 
but unfortunately no official information is available 
to verify this.
A final reform was introduced through Law 26425 
in December 2008, which completely eliminated the 
capitalization scheme, transferring all contributors 
to a single public pay-as-you-go system. The transfer 
included beneficiaries of the private management system 
(unless they were receiving their pensions through a 
life annuity) and accumulated financial assets.
Reforms of coverage for older adults
Three major actions have been taken for this 
group of beneficiaries in recent years: (i) an easing 
of restrictions on access to non-contributory pension 
benefits; (ii) the pension moratorium programme, which 
enabled a huge number of older adults with insufficient 
or no contributions to the system to retire immediately; 
and (iii) an early retirement programme. 
Argentina has had non-contributory pension 
benefits for many years, but access to these benefits 
has been restricted, both in terms of  the effective 
conditions for obtaining those benefits (they were 
heavily rationed and those requesting them were put on 
a waiting list) and the low level of pensions they paid. 
Meanwhile, the coverage of the traditional retirement 
pension system among older adults steadily declined, 
and pressure grew to review the non-contributory 
scheme and make it more accessible.
In March 2003, the national government created 
the Senior Citizens Plan (Plan Mayores), a programme 
that sought to incorporate the over-70s into the Heads 
of Household Plan (Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar). A 
few months later, in August 2003, the restriction 
on the number of  non-contributory pensions was 
eliminated, and this triggered a sustained increase in 
the total number of beneficiaries. Thus, in late 2006, 
the number of beneficiaries was more than twice that 
of three years earlier, while the real value of benefits 
had also doubled.
The second change, which introduced a massive 
pension moratorium programme, had greater 
repercussions. This programme enabled all individuals 
of minimum retirement age to apply for a retirement 
pension, by “paying” the contributions needed to 
satisfy the minimum system requirements. The key 
law in this reform was passed in December 2004, 
but the response was slow in terms of  benefits 
granted until May 2007. Since then, application 
procedures and their processing has been speeded 
up, generating about 2.1 million new beneficiaries 
by mid-2009. Figure 5 shows how the number of 
pension beneficiaries grew until the mid-1990s, before 
stalling and then decreasing. Nonetheless, thanks to 
the moratorium, the total number of  beneficiaries 
has grown rapidly since 2005.
Lastly, the third reform affecting coverage levels 
for older adults was based on the introduction of 
an early retirement scheme in December 2004. This 
enabled workers who had completed the minimum 
number of  years of  required contributions, but 
were up to five years younger than the established 
retirement age, to retire on a reduced pension. As of 
December 2008, roughly 46,000 workers had joined 
this programme.
(b)  Level of benefits
In the case of pension payments, actions have been 
taken in three areas over the last few years. Firstly, 
minimum pensions have been increased significantly; 
secondly, the benefits expected by pay-as-you-go system 
affiliates have been altered; and thirdly, an automatic 
indexation mechanism has been reintroduced after 
13 years for pay-as-you-go system benefits.
The key policy in relation to the level of benefits 
involved a sustained increase in the minimum asset 
level and, more recently, a discretionary adjustment 
in the other benefit scales. Figure 3 showed how 
minimum pension assets grew steadily in real terms 
between 2004 and 2007. By the end of that period, 
the real value of  the minimum pension paid had 
doubled in relation to six years earlier. The other 
assets also grew, but at a slower rate, which caused a 
flattening of the benefits pyramid and weakened the 
contributory nature of the system. 
The reforms made to the system in 2007 and 2008 
also included increases in parameters corresponding 
to the additional benefit for permanency (paid to 
those who chose to remain in the payg scheme after 
the 1993 reform). Based on this amendment, the 
benefit corresponding to contributions made since 
1994 increased by 76%. 
Lastly, following years of  political and legal 
controversy, the Government introduced an automatic 
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pension asset indexation mechanism in 2008. This 
involved two annual adjustments in which all benefits 
of  the pay-as-you-go system are increased in line 
with a composite index that takes account of wage 
increases and social security revenue. The law also 
provides that the same index will be used in future to 
raise benchmark wages for the purpose of calculating 
the initial benefit for workers taking retirement.
(c)  Investments of the assets of the public regime
Thanks to an improvement of  the financial 
performance of  the public regime since 2003, the 
National Social Security Administration (anses) 
started to generate increasingly large surpluses. anses 
receives the contributions made by workers and their 
employers, together with other tax revenues that were 
assigned to it in the early 1990s to cover its deficit 
at that time. The surplus was generated by a rapid 
increase in pension contributions and tax revenues, 
while most benefits were increased by smaller amounts. 
In 2007, the Government created the Sustainability 
Guarantee Fund, to manage these surplus resources. 
When affiliates of the capitalization regime transferred 
to the pay-as-you-go scheme, the corresponding assets 
were deposited in this fund managed by anses. Law 
26425 introduced additional regulations including 
the creation of a legislative supervision committee 
and a council with civil society representatives. The 
investment policies to be followed under the new 
reform were not regulated in detail in the law. 
The Fund maintained a low profile until late 2008, 
when it received nearly 100 billion pesos, about 10% 
of gdp. Since then, the Government has made several 
announcements about the destination of these funds, 
including their investment in trust funds for consumer 
finance, automobile purchase, the financing of small 
and medium-sized enterprises, and others.
(d)  Potential fiscal effects of the reforms
Owing to the political and institutional processes 
through which all of these reforms were adopted, there 
has been no formal and painstaking consideration of 
their potential short-or medium-term fiscal effects. None 
of the recent reforms was adopted in response to a fiscal 
need, nor was the topic aired through presentations 
or public debates. Until now, no agency or official 
organization has published a document or analysis 
on the short- and medium-term fiscal implications of 
the reforms; and official statements and references on 
the subject have been extremely vague.
Among the reforms implemented, transfers from 
the capitalization scheme to the pay-as-you-go regime 
FIGURE 5 
Pension benefits in the national system, by type of benefit, 1970-2009
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and the moratorium seem to be the two most important 
elements from the fiscal standpoint. Naturally, the 
transfers had an immediate effect on the income of 
the public system. Firstly, the transfer of the balances 
of individual accounts to anses, between 2007 and 
2009, meant an injection of assets valued at 100 billion 
pesos, equivalent to roughly two years of  system 
outlays. Nonetheless, most of  these assets are not 
liquid, so their short- and medium-term availability is 
limited. At the same time, the incorporation of some 
5 million contributors to the pay-as-you-go regime, 
means an additional annual revenue for anses of  18 
billion pesos (2% of gdp).
On the expenditure side, the cost of the moratorium 
programme was similar, so in the short term, the 
two measures would seem to offset each other. 
Nonetheless, the medium-and long-term effects are 
less clear, since they will depend on decisions made 
by future Governments on the possibility of keeping 
the moratorium scheme open quasi-permanently, or 
closing it (and consequently resuming a declining 
coverage trend).
The construction of a projections model that 
makes it possible to estimate medium- and long-term 
fiscal trends relative to the Argentine retirement pension 
system is a complicated task, but not impossible; and 
its preparation and dissemination should be one of 
the authority’s priorities. A number of trends seem 
clear: the fiscal impact of the 2006-2008 moratorium 
will fade and eventually disappear in 15 or 20 years’ 
time; whereas the positive fiscal effects caused by 
the closure of the capitalization regime should be 
offset as the number of retirees in the pay-as-you-go 
system increases. 
III
The reforms in Chile
Twenty-eight years after the pioneering pension 
reform that replaced the traditional pay-as-you-go 
system with one based on individual accounts with a 
capitalization mechanism under private management, 
the Chilean National Congress passed a second 
comprehensive reform of  the pension system in 
January 2008. This section will describe the political 
and social backdrop to this reform, analyse its main 
contents and preliminary results, and identify some 
of the outstanding challenges.
1. The Chilean pension system up to 2005
(a)  Overview of the system
The current Chilean pension system can be divided 
into three main components: the poverty-prevention, 
contributory and voluntary pillars.
Prior to the 2008 reform, the poverty-prevention 
pillar was based on two programs: (i) the non-
contributory assistance pension system (pasis); and 
(ii) the State guaranteed minimum pensions system 
(pmg). The latter targeted individuals who, despite 
having contributed for at least 20 years to the individual 
capitalization scheme, had failed to accumulate the 
minimum amount needed to retire. 
The contributory pillar was reformed drastically 
in 1980. The previous system was based on a series of 
pay-as-you-go schemes, with defined benefits calculated 
as a proportion of the wages received during the last 
period of  employment. These schemes generated 
burgeoning deficits, reflecting major imbalances 
between the benefits promised and the contributions 
actually paid into the system. In 1980, the military 
government created a single national scheme based on 
individual accounts, in which each worker’s savings 
were deposited and invested in financial instruments 
by specialized firms, known as pension fund managers 
(the afp system).4 These fund managers are free to 
set their commission for the various services provided 
(collection and recording of contributions, investments, 
calculation and payment of benefits, and assistance to 
the public); and individuals can opt to change their 
afp at any time.5
Tax incentives are available for individuals who 
make additional voluntary contributions, through a 
special set of financial products, to supplement the 
4  Only military and security-force personnel remained in their 
previous pay-as-you-go systems.
5  For a detailed description of the current afp system see Berstein 
(2007), available at www.spensiones.cl. There is an extensive 
literature on the repercussions of  the 1980 pension reform on 
coverage, financial development, national saving and economic 
performance. See, for example: Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003); 
World Bank (1994); Holzmann and Hinz (2005).
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mandatory savings made in the contributory scheme. 
Funds can be withdrawn before retirement, but persons 
doing so are penalized through an addition to their 
income tax liability at the time of the withdrawal.
(b)  Recent trend in pension coverage
As the Chilean pension system has been based 
essentially on the contributions paid into it by wage-
earners in the formal sector, the contributory scheme 
is one of the key determinants of pension coverage. 
Since the early schemes in the 1930s, between 60% and 
70% of the Chilean labour force has been affiliated to 
the pension system (Arenas de Mesa, 2000), although 
the indicator varies somewhat according to business 
cycles and conditions in the labour market. Following 
the 1981 reform, the available data have provided 
information on real contributions made and not just 
the number of workers affiliated. Figure 6 shows the 
proportion of contributors in the labour force, which 
has grown slowly over the last two decades.
Nonetheless, it has been claimed that the density 
of worker contributions, or the fraction of a person’s 
working life for which he or she makes contributions 
to the social security system, is more important 
than contributory coverage. Figure 7 shows the 
distribution of  this measure for Chilean men and 
women and highlights tremendous heterogeneity in 
contributory histories, which range from individuals 
who contributed throughout the entire period to 
those who hardly made any contribution at all. This 
heterogeneity is particularly notable among women, 
who display a clearly bimodal distribution, with a 
significant concentration at the two extremes (0% 
and 100%).6
Lastly, figure 8 shows the distribution of coverage 
for older adults in the Chilean population. Half  of 
all over-70s receive a pension from a contributory 
scheme (currently, most of this coverage is provided 
by pensions from pay-as-you-go regimes, but these 
will become less important as the new system gains 
maturity). The right-hand figure shows the different 
6  Contribution density was estimated on the basis of real data 
for 24,000 workers considered active while they were between 16 
and 59 years of age.
FIGURE 6
historical contributory coverage in Chile, 1986-2004
(Percentages)
Source: Solange Berstein, Guillermo Larraín and Francisco Pino, “Chilean pension reform: coverage facts and policy alternatives”, 
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FIGURE 7 
density of contributions to the pension system
(Percentages)
FIGURE 8 
income sources in old age
Source: Solange Berstein, Guillermo Larraín and Francisco Pino, “Chilean pension reform: coverage facts and policy alternatives”, 
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income sources for individuals who do not receive 
direct pensions from the contributory scheme. As can 
be seen, assistance pensions, widows pensions and 
disability pensions provide some degree of coverage 
to around 60% of this group. 
(c) The political climate: Motives for the reform
Several factors may have led the 2005 presidential 
candidate Michelle Bachelet to make pension reform 
one of her key campaign promises. Since the return 
to democracy, the centre-left coalition had won three 
consecutive elections promoting at least one important 
reform of the policies or institutions created during 
the 17 years of Pinochet government. Reform of the 
pension system, particularly its non-contributory 
component, was one of the outstanding debts of the 
coalition government. The demand for a reform to 
improve coverage was justified partly by studies on the 
subject published in 2005 and 2006, which suggested 
that a large sector of the population would be unable 
to finance a minimum pension and would not qualify 
for the minimum guaranteed pension.7
A second key factor in the decision to undertake a 
significant reform of the non-contributory component 
was the fiscal slack created by a gradual reduction in 
the transition costs generated by the original reform 
of 1980. As shown in figure 9, both the operating 
deficit arising from the gradual elimination of the 
pay-as-you-go system, and the liabilities contracted 
(through recognition bonds) with contributors to 
the old system who had transferred to the individual 
capitalization scheme, had already started to shrink 
by 2005. This provided an opportunity to introduce 
a broad social safety net for older adults. 
Lastly, there was concern at the increasing 
concentration occurring in the afp industry. Despite 
the extraordinary returns that participating firms were 
7  See Berstein, Larraín and Pino (2006) and Arenas de Mesa and 
others (2006).
FIGURE 9
relation between pensions and fiscal expenditure in Chile 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (eclac), La protección social de cara al futuro: acceso, 


































REfoRmInG ThE PEnSIon REfoRmS: ARGEnTInA And ChILE  •  RAfAEL RofmAn, EdUARdo fAJnzyLbER And GERmán hERRERA
C E P A L  R E V I E W  1 0 1  •  A U G U S T  2 0 1 0
earning on their assets, no new firm had entered the 
market for a long time, which suggested that price 
competition was not functioning adequately in this 
particular market. These were certainly some of the 
factors that influenced President Bachelet’s decision 
to make reforming the system her main contribution 
to Chile’s economic and social development.
2. The Chilean pension reform of 2008
In March 2006, the recently elected President Bachelet 
formed a presidential committee of 15 professional 
experts drawn from different areas related to the 
pension system, with a mission to produce a report 
making recommendations for reform.8 Two years 
later, an exhaustive legislative bill was finally approved 
by Congress, which constituted the most substantial 
reorganization since the original 1980 reform creating 
the afp system. The new reform maintained the 
original essence of  the system, while introducing 
significant improvements to increase the coverage of 
the poverty-prevention pillar, improve gender equity, 
encourage greater competition in the afp industry, 
and introduce a more flexible investment regime for 
the fund managers.
(a) Description of the reforms
— Measures to improve the scope and quality of 
coverage of the pension system
The individual nature of the afp system creates a 
direct link between the frequency, timing and amount 
of  the contributions made by an individual, and 
the benefits obtained. Benefits tend to be less when 
individuals fail to make contributions for long periods 
owing to occupational decisions or labour informality, 
if  they enter the formal labour market late, or if  they 
make contributions that are not proportional to their 
real income. Moreover, actuarial calculations suggest 
that longer life expectancy requires larger savings to 
allow for reasonable replacement rates. The additional 
savings needed could be generated by increasing 
voluntary saving, postponing retirement, or reducing 
the periods for which the pension is actually received. 
The 2008 reform addresses these problems through 
a series of measures, as described below.
— The new solidarity pillar (nps)
The 2008 reform replaces the existing welfare 
pensions (pasis) and minimum guaranteed pension 
8  See Consejo Asesor Presidencial para la Reforma Previsional 
(2006).
(pmg) programmes, with a single scheme that 
guarantees all individuals over 65 years of  age in 
the poorest 60% of the population access to a basic 
guaranteed pension irrespective of their contribution 
record.9,10 This new programme pays old-age and 
disability subsidies financed by the State.
Individuals who have not made any contributions 
at all will be entitled to a basic old-age solidarity pension 
(PBS), if they are over 65 and satisfy the corresponding 
affluence and residency requirements.11 Individuals 
whose contributions are sufficient to finance a pension 
below a given threshold, are entitled to receive a 
solidarity pension supplement (aps) subject to the 
same affluence and residency requirements.12 The 
disability programme provides benefits under similar 
conditions, but its target population is individuals 
between 18 and 64 years of age. Once disabled persons 
reach 65 years of age, they are eligible for the old-age 
solidarity benefits. 
Figure 10 illustrates the subsidy scheme, in which 
solidarity subsidies and total pensions are shown as 
a function of the contributory pension.
Two elements of this design need to be highlighted: 
integration of the contributory system with the new 
solidarity pillar, and concern for the contributory 
incentives that this integration generates. Integration 
ensures that all individuals in the first three quintiles 
will receive a pension equivalent to at least the pbs. If  
the benefit had been defined with a ceiling (as is the 
case with disability pensions), this would have created 
incentives for low-income individuals not to contribute, 
since their pension would not rise with the number 
or amount of contributions made. Under the chosen 
design, total old-age pensions rise monotonically with 
9  For an analysis of the poverty-prevention pillar and alternative 
designs, see Fajnzylber (2006).
10  The scheme will be applied gradually. In the first year, starting in 
July 2008, the basic solidarity pension will be equivalent to US$ 137, 
and will be limited to the poorest 40% of the population; it will 
then rise to roughly US$ 172 in July 2009, covering the lowest 45% 
income group. The final benefits scheme will enter into force on 
July 2012, covering the poorest 60% of the population.
11  The affluence test is a means of verifying income to ensure that 
the person does not belong to the wealthiest 40% of the population 
(60% in the first year). Initial implementation (two years) will be 
based on the “Ficha de Protección Social”. The residency test 
requires individuals to have lived in Chile for at least 20 years since 
their 20th birthday and for at least three of the five years prior to 
application for the benefit.
12  The Solidarity Pension Supplement will be paid firstly to 
individuals whose contributory pensions are below US$ 161 and 
who were among the poorest 40% of the population in July 2008. 
The supplement will be steadily increased until 2012, when it will 
cover those who receive less than US$ 586 through their contributory 
pensions and belong to the 60% lowest-income group. 
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the savings financed by the individuals in question: 
every peso saved always increases the pension, although 
the relation is not one to one. 
— Compulsory contributions by self-employed 
workers
To be consistent with the extension of coverage 
resulting from the introduction of the nps, the reform 
requires all self-employed workers who receive taxable 
income to make social-security contributions based 
on their annual earnings. This requirement will be 
introduced gradually, starting with a three-year 
informative period, followed by another equal period in 
which contributions will be deducted from self-employed 
workers, unless they expressly choose otherwise (the 
default choice will be to participate in the system). 
During this transition period, the fraction of taxable 
income subject to this requirement will increase from 
40% in the first year to 70% in the second, and then to 
100% in the third year. From 2015 onwards, compulsory 
participation will be implemented in full.
— Collective voluntary savings plans (apvcs) 
and incentives for middle- and lower- income 
workers.
In Chile, as in many other countries, voluntary 
savings for old age can benefit from tax exemptions. 
This type of voluntary pension saving is known as 
Ahorro Previsional Voluntario (apv). apv plans can be 
implemented through a special account in an afp, 
through special mutual funds offered by banks or 
other financial institutions, and through life insurance 
contracts with saving components. Given their design, 
this type of tax break mostly attracts voluntary savings 
from high-income individuals who are subject to the 
highest marginal income-tax rates. For most low- and 
middle-income workers, who are not liable for income 
tax, regular tax allowances do not provide incentives 
to participate in these plans. 
The reform includes two mechanisms to increase 
the voluntary savings of dependent workers generally, 
and the savings of workers who do not benefit from 
regular tax exemptions in particular. Firstly, it creates 
the apvc scheme which provides tax incentives for 
firms to offer their workers saving plans in which the 
firm makes complementary contributions.13 Secondly, 
13  apvc plans follow the same principle as private 401K pension 
plans in the United States, or other defined-contribution occupational 
plans implemented in other countries. Employers can set up saving 
contracts in an institution offering individual apv plans (afps, 
banks, mutual funds and insurance companies), supplement the 
contributions made by workers, and define a minimum number 
of years of contribution to benefit from the contributions made 
by the firm. The conditions need to be the same for all workers, 
and employers may in no circumstances restrict benefits to certain 
groups.
FIGURE 10 
final subsidies and pensions under the new solidarity pillar
Source: Prepared by the authors.
aps: Solidarity pension supplement
pbs: Basic solidarity pension
APS
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the reform contains two additional incentives for 
individual voluntary saving: 
(i) workers can choose whether the tax exemption 
is applied at the time of making contributions 
or when they are withdrawn. 
(ii) workers can benefit from a State-financed supplement 
worth 15% of the voluntary contributions (either 
individual or collective), which is added to the 
amount of  the pension, subject to an annual 
ceiling, or else retire earlier.
— Subsidies on the pension contributions of 
young workers.
A specific feature of defined-contribution systems 
is that compound interest over a long period means 
that early contributions can have a significant effect 
on the pension eventually received. For this reason, 
and with a view to reducing youth unemployment, a 
special subsidy was created to partly pay for the pension 
obligations of  employers hiring workers between 
18 and 35 years of age. Specifically, employers will 
receive a subsidy equivalent to 50% of the pension 
cost (contribution plus commission) of a worker on 
the minimum wage, during the first 24 contributions 
made by young workers whose pay is no higher than 
1.5 times the minimum monthly wage.
Those workers will also receive a State-financed 
supplement equivalent to the hiring subsidy, which 
will be deposited directly in their individual account. 
This supplement will be in effect for the first 24 
contributions between 18 and 35 years of age, made 
on pay below 1.5 times the minimum wage.
(b) Measures to improve the gender equity of the 
pension system
The reform put special emphasis on measures to 
increase gender equity. In general, women tend to: 
(i) Go long periods without making contributions 
while they look after their children or other 
dependent relatives.
(ii) Be employed in lower paying jobs (compared to 
men with similar education levels).
(iii) Retire before men. 
(iv) Live longer than men.14
These elements create significant gender differences, 
when combined in a pension system that does not 
14  The minimum retirement age is 60 for women and 65 for men. 
The report of the Presidential Advisory Committee on Pension 
Reform proposed raising the retirement age for women to 65, but 
this recommendation was not included in the legislation sent to 
Congress.
involve redistribution between the sexes during the 
retirement phase.
— Introduction of the new solidarity pillar (nps)
To tackle these differences, the reform implements 
a number of measures, in particular introduction of 
the nps. By design, the solidarity benefits will most 
often be paid to women, who are more likely not to 
have made any contributions ever, or to have done 
so less frequently than men. Moreover, the benefits 
are independent of  a person’s sex, which tends to 
benefit women more, since they usually live longer 
than men.
— State-financed bonus for mothers for each live-
born or adopted child
The reform introduces a subsidy for each live-
born or adopted child, equivalent to the contribution 
on a full-time minimum wage for 18 months. This is 
increased by an annual rate of return —equivalent 
to the net average return on type-C funds in the afp 
system— from the date of birth until the mother is 
65 years old. The benefit is subject to a residency 
requirement but not to the income test.
As Chile has one of the longest maternity leave 
periods (18 weeks) in the region, and also has one 
of the lowest female labour-force participation rates, 
the introduction of this benefit is important to obtain 
adequate retirement pensions, particularly for low-
income female workers. Apart from the financial 
benefit, the measure is valued as a way of  giving 
social recognition to the (unpaid) activities of giving 
birth and looking after children in their early years 
of life.
— Economic compensation in the case of divorce 
or annulment of marriage
The reform introduces the legal concept of pension 
compensation in the event of divorce or annulment of 
marriage, whereby, if necessary, a judge may order the 
transfer of pension funds between individual accounts, 
as a way of providing economic compensation to the 
party who loses out during marriage. This transfer 
may not exceed 50% of the funds accumulated during 
the marriage in the account held by the spouse that 
is required to compensate.
— Separation of disability insurance contracts 
between men and women and transfer of the 
premium difference to the individual accounts 
of the lower-cost group
Prior to the reform, the premium charged for the 
disability and survivor insurance (sis) to participants 
in the afp system was the same for men and women, 
even though women are less likely to become disabled 
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and do not generate survivor benefits for their spouses, 
unless the latter are disabled. To avoid this cross-
subsidy, the reform requires an afp to sign separate 
insurance contracts for men and women, charge 
affiliates the higher of the new premiums (probably 
corresponding to the contract for men) and deposit 
the difference with respect to the lower premium in 
the savings accounts of the lower-risk group (most 
likely women). As a result, women’s final contribution 
to their pension funds will be slightly higher than the 
10% indicated in the law. This can be viewed as a way 
to maintain a single-cost insurance for all participants, 
while increasing the amount of saving available for 
women at the time of retirement.
— Pensions for widowers
One of the main gender asymmetries prevailing in 
the pension system is the impossibility of generating 
survivor pensions for widowers, unless they are 
disabled. As part of the reform, both the requirement 
to reserve part of the accumulated pension funds to 
pay survivor pensions, and the low coverage of the 
survivor insurance are applicable to men and women 
alike. In the first case, the inclusion of widowers will 
actuarially reduce the retirement pension for women 
in return for the additional benefit. In the second case, 
the additional coverage will be financed by a single 
insurance premium corresponding to all women in the 
system, thus eliminating the current cross-subsidies 
from insured women to insured men.
The measures described here reflect the many 
steps that can be taken to improve pension equity 
between men and women by adjusting the design of 
the system. Nonetheless, pension inequality largely 
stems from cultural factors that govern the division of 
labour within households and labour-market distortions 
that operate through job or wage discrimination. 
Such factors cannot be adequately addressed through 
pension system reforms.
(c) Measures to make the afp industry more 
competitive15
One of the main pillars of the 1980 reform was 
the introduction of competition between afps as a 
measure to discipline the fund managers and ensure 
good performance, high-quality service and low cost. 
The reality has shown that competition in an industry 
where the service is compulsory and extremely complex 
for the average consumer to understand, and in which 
15  For an exhaustive analysis of these measures, see Reyes and 
Castro (2008).
the benefits are only perceived in the long term, does 
not always adopt the desired form. In recent years 
there has been a trend towards market concentration 
(five firms manage pension funds equivalent to 60% 
of gdp), high returns on assets earned by afps, and 
no new market entrants in the last nine years.16 
— Bidding for affiliates 
The reform addresses these problems by 
influencing both the demand and supply sides of 
the market.17 On the demand side, elasticity is 
increased substantially by the introduction of  an 
affiliate bidding process. All new participants in the 
pension system will automatically be assigned to 
the afp offering the lowest commission during the 
most recent bidding process; and they must remain 
in that afp for a minimum period.18 The successful 
afp will thus receive a constant flow of affiliates for 
a two-year period, without having to incur expenses 
on marketing or sales personnel. This measure also 
creates an attractive starting point for potential 
entrants, since incumbent firms are not allowed to 
charge a different commission for different groups of 
participants (current affiliates or new workers).
— Commission structure
Another explanation for the low sensitivity of 
demand, particularly in relation to the fees charged, 
is the complexity of comparing commissions between 
different fund managers, which may charge in different 
ways (partly through a fixed charge and partly as a 
set percentage of eligible income). In an attempt to 
facilitate price comparison between afps, the reform 
simplified the commission structure, with the result 
that the afps may only charge a single commission 
expressed as a fixed percentage of eligible income.
— Requirement or facilities for subcontracting 
some afp functions.
On the supply side, a series of measures aim to 
facilitate the outsourcing of certain afp functions, 
and the range of services that can be subcontracted 
has been significantly expanded. One of them, the 
sis, must now be contracted by the afp system as a 
whole, unlike the previous situation in which each 
16  For a detailed description of the returns on assets obtained by 
afps, see Valdés and Marinovic (2005).
17  The legislative bill sent to Congress included a proposal to enable 
local banks to enter the afp industry by creating subsidiary firms. 
Nonetheless, this was rejected by opposition parties partly to avoid 
creating a State afp as a subsidiary of Banco Estado. 
18  The affiliate may switch to another fund manager if  the winning 
bidder does not fulfill the regulation or underperforms other 
fund managers by more than can be explained by the difference 
in commission.
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afp had to take its own insurance, and contracts were 
designed so that most of the risk fell on the afp itself.19 
This created a powerful incentive to compete on the 
ability to selectively attract low-risk individuals, to 
the detriment of good investment management, cost 
reduction, or better-quality service. The requirement 
to sign a systemic insurance contract means the risk 
effectively falls on the insurance companies, and the 
incentive to “hive-off” risky individuals is eliminated. 
The design of  the sis auction will be regulated in 
detail by the Pension and Securities and Insurance 
Supervising Authorities. By law, the insurance coverage 
must be tendered separately for men and women, 
although it is possible to form groups of affiliates 
chosen at random and assigned to different firms to 
avoid undue concentration of risks. 
(d) Greater flexibility for the afp investment 
regime 
With the aim of limiting the absolute exposure of 
investment portfolios, the original regulation included 
a complex set of quantitative limits: per issuer, per 
issue, by type of asset (including limits on variable 
income), by fund origin (national or foreign), among 
others. Most of these limits were included in the law 
regulating the system, and there was little scope for 
interpretation or flexibility. The reform relegated 
most of these limits to secondary regulations, and 
a Technical Investment Board (Consejo Técnico de 
Inversiones) was set up to make recommendations on 
afp investment and regulation policies.20 
Greater flexibility will be matched by enhanced 
transparency requirements, in terms of  explicit 
investment policies and the resolution of conflicts 
of interest. The reformed law includes the possibility 
of setting limits based on indicators of investment 
portfolio risk, instead of quantitative limits by type 
of asset.
19  The insurance contracts included ex post adjustments equivalent 
to a risk transfer between the insurance company and the AFP, 
relegating the coverage provided by the insurance to extreme 
cases only. 
20  Only the main structural limits remained in the law, subject to an 
upper limit under which the Central Bank of Chile has authority 
to set the real limits: a variable income limit by type of fund; a 
total foreign investment limit (which could be as high as 80% of 
the funds) replaceable by specific limits by type of fund; specific 
limits by type of fund regarding the amount of investments not 
covered in foreign currencies; and lastly, a limit on investments in 
financial instruments issued by institutions that have been operating 
for less than three years.
e) Expected effects and fiscal sustainability of the 
reform
Given that the benefits of  the new solidarity 
pillar were proposed as entitlements, the reform 
means a significant State commitment towards 
future pensioner generations. Although detailed 
information on the fiscal repercussions of the reform 
in the medium and long term is scarce, the available 
data suggest the cost could be significant. The draft 
reform bill was accompanied by a financial report 
containing estimates of fiscal cost between 2008 and 
2025. Table 2 shows the expected effects of all the 
provisions included in the reformed law, including 
some that cannot be considered part of the pension 
reform, strictly speaking. Projections show that the 
fiscal cost of the reform should be less than 0.5% of 
gdp in the first few years, rising to roughly 1% of 
gdp by 2025.21
— Preliminary results of the new solidarity pillar
Pensions under the new solidarity system started 
to be paid on 1 July 2008 (Fajnzylber, 2010). Initially, 
only basic solidarity pensions (pbs) were paid, both for 
old age and disability, to beneficiaries mainly coming 
from the welfare and old-age and disability pension 
system.22 As from October 2008, the solidarity pension 
supplements (aps) started to be paid, although these 
still represent a small fraction of total benefits. 
As shown in table 1, a total of 623,296 solidarity 
subsidies were paid in September 2009, of  which 
95% corresponded to the pbs (62% old-age and 
33% disability), with 64% of benefits being paid to 
women.
The small size of the aps compared to the pbs is 
thought to be transitory, stemming from the following 
phenomena:
(i) Most current pbs beneficiaries were originally 
recipients of welfare pensions, some of whom 
took their pension, used up their balance, and 
then applied for the welfare benefit. Once the 
system is operating, low-balance affiliates will 
be covered by an aps pension from the outset.
(ii) On a temporary basis, affiliates who were over 
65 years of  age and were already receiving a 
programmed retirement pension when the reform 
21  For further details, see Dirección de Presupuesto (2008).
22  Between January and June 2008, an average of 228,065 old-age 
welfare pensions were paid, as well as 212,327 disability pensions 
(www.suseso.cl). Some of the disability pensions were paid to persons 
over 65 years of age, so the figures are not directly comparable 
with the basic solidarity old age and disability pensions for which 
payment began in July 2008.
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TABLE 1
Number of pbs and aps paid per month, between July 2008 and September 2009

























July 2008 101 418 84 277 - - 189 152 108 433  - - 290 570 192 710  - - 
August 2008 101 669 84 831  - - 190 467 109 473  - - 292 136 194304  - - 
September 2010 108 162 84 559  - - 221 383 108 959  - - 329 545 193 518  - - 
October 2008 110 075 84 437 955 229 230 808 108 604 2 444 217 340 883 193 041 3 399 446 
November 2008 111 136 84 286 1 159 294 236 178 108 404 3 067 290 347 314 192 690 4 226 584 
December 2013 113 630 84 823 1 234 348 244 815 109 628 3 251 352 358 445 194 451 4 485 700 
January 2010 114 748 85 291 1 765 481 249 383 110 901 4 434 468 364 131 196 192 6 199 949 
February 1995 115 183 85 481 2 132 584 251 808 111 775 5 048 596 366 991 197 256 7 180 1 180 
March 2009 115 759 85 609 2 584 703 254 074 112 459 5 703 787 369 833 198 068 8 287 1 490 
April 2009 116 177 85 787 3 131 922 255 795 113 104 6 499 1 119 371 972 198 891 9 630 2 041 
May 2009 116 638 86 085 3 842 1 125 258 094 114 003 7 208 1 372 374 732 200 088 11 050 2 497 
June 2009 116 982 86 441 4 373 1 346 260 086 114 983 7 817 1 674 377 068 201 424 12 190 3 020 
July 2009 117 124 86 710 4 882 1 670 261 334 116 028 8 395 2 118 378 458 202 738 13 277 3 788 
August 2009 117 348 87 229 5 603 1 969 261 917 117 514 9 052 2 469 379 265 204 743 14 655 4 438 
September 2010 117 430 87 678 15 010 2 203 267 244 118 761 12 193 2 777 384 674 206 439 27 203 4 980 
Source: Prepared on the basis of  information available at www.spensiones.cl.
pbs: Basic solidarity pension.
aps: Solidarity pension supplement.
took effect can apply for the aps benefit when they 
wish, with the pension calculated on the basis of 
the balance at the time the request is filed. This 
means that many individuals with low account 
balances may prefer to stay with the minimum 
pension (currently around Ch$105,000) until 
they use up their balance, and then apply for 
the aps benefit (which will be equivalent to a pbs 
pension of Ch$75,000, because the individual 
would not have any asset balance remaining).23 
As this process will occur gradually, the number 
of aps beneficiaries should gradually rise. 
In terms of  the amount of  benefits, the law 
provided that the pbs benefits would initially be 
Ch$60,000 per month. These were increased to 
Ch$75,000 per month as from July 2009. Table 2 shows 
the average amount of benefits paid each month, by 
type of benefit and the sex of the beneficiary.24 
23  As an example, persons whose pension calculated on a programmed 
retirement basis would be equivalent to Ch$ 30,000 could choose 
to apply for the aps pension, in which case they would receive 
Ch$ 96,000 for the rest of their life; or else they could opt to keep 
the minimum pension (Ch$ 105,000) until the balance is used up 
(which would occur in about four years five), and receive the pbs 
of  Ch$ 75,000 from then on.
24 The average amounts include payments made retroactively 
from the moment of filing the request. For example, if  a person 
It should be noted that average aps benefits 
should always initially be less than those of the pbs. 
In table 2, this is not the case because of the initial 
payments, which can include more than one monthly 
payment and therefore tend to be higher. The situation 
should normalize itself  through time.
— Remaining challenges 
The most important aspect of  the reform 
described above is that, instead of replacing the afp 
system created in 1980, it improves it, by integrating 
a State-financed poverty-prevention pillar, extending 
the voluntary pillar to middle-income workers, and 
introducing a number of measures to extend coverage 
and enhance competition in the afp market. This 
is the outcome of a lengthy two-year participatory 
process, preceded by exhaustive research and various 
evaluation efforts. 
A number of challenges remain to be addressed 
in the coming years, relating both to implementation 
of  the reform and to longer-term issues. In the 
requested an aps benefit on 1 July 2008, and the first payment was 
made in October 2008, that payment would include the amount 
corresponding to four payments. This explains why the averages 
are higher than the maximum benefit (US$ 60,000 before July 2009 
and US$ 70,000 thereafter) and in the initial aps payment months, 
average amounts are way above the maximum benefit.
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TABLE 2 
Average amount of pbs and aps per month 
(Dollar equivalent) a

























July 2008 120 120 120 120  120 120
August 2008 120 120   120 120   120 120   
September 2010 120 120  120 120  120 120
October 2008 126 121 401 314 132 120 316 326 130 121 340 320
November 2008 124 121 148 134 128 121 126 142 127 121 132 138
December 2013 129 125 175 116 132 129 122 120 131 127 137 118
January 2010 124 125 221 182 125 130 174 163 125 128 188 172
February 1995 123 124 147 150 124 129 118 158 124 127 126 154
March 2009 123 124 156 135 123 129 116 157 123 127 129 147
April 2009 122 125 180 173 122 129 146 195 122 127 157 185
May 2009 122 126 172 148 123 131 121 151 122 129 139 150
June 2009 122 127 140 140 123 133 113 147 123 130 122 144
July 2009 152 157 174 207 152 164 151 210 152 161 160 209
August 2009 154 159 207 183 152 168 163 187 153 164 180 185
September 2010 152 159 132 169 158 166 157 173 156 163 143 172
Source: Prepared on the basis of  information available at www.spensiones.cl 
pbs: Basic solidarity pension.
aps: Solidarity pension supplement.
a The equivalence calculation used an exchange rate of  Ch$500 per dollar.
former category, the progressive application of the 
new solidarity pillar will probably face risks. Firstly, 
there is no clear knowledge of the real number of 
potential beneficiaries, since that depends on wage 
trends, compliance with the regulations, and the return 
earned by the pension funds. Moreover, organizing new 
institutions, creating conditions to fully integrate self-
employed workers into the system, and implementing 
systems to identify the beneficiaries of the new solidarity 
benefits and make the corresponding payments, will 
require a major government commitment. 
Among the longer-term challenges, not necessarily 
addressed by the recent reforms, the most important 
is a problem shared by most middle- and high-income 
countries: longer life expectancy and higher medical 
costs for older adults. The technological progress made 
in recent decades has meant longer life expectancy, 
based on increasingly sophisticated treatment and 
equipment. Although there is a reasonable idea of 
how long current pensioners are likely to live, little is 
known about the life expectancy of individuals who 
are entering the labour market today. The current 
contribution rate of 10% of taxable income will likely 
be insufficient to finance pensions in the future; and 
it is unclear whether generational differences will 
enable workers to remain in the labour market for 
long enough to compensate for this increase. Most 
of the burden will fall on the capacity of individuals 
to foresee these deficits and increase their voluntary 
savings. Given that pension systems were created 
to ease short-term tensions, is not obvious that this 
voluntary reaction will have the necessary timing and 
force. Greater effort is needed to improve knowledge on 
this uncertain future and, consequently, to adopt the 
(usually unpopular) measures of raising contribution 
rates or the minimum retirement age.
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This article has thus far analysed the recent pension 
reforms in Argentina and Chile. Having reached 
this point, we will now briefly outline the relevance 
of the political processes underlying the retirement 
policy discussed above. The authors’ interest in this 
aspect stems from the fact that several substantive 
elements that define the functioning of the Argentine 
and Chilean pension systems, seem to originate from 
the characteristics of the political institutions that 
design and manage them, rather than their inherent 
“technical” problems. 
Issues relating to the relevance and consequences 
of  political institutions and public policy-making 
processes clearly transcend pension policy. Much 
of  the current public-policy literature concerns 
the idea that a degree of policy-making capacity is 
needed for policies to be effective; specifically that 
several significant aspects of public policies depend 
on the ability to consolidate inter-temporal policy 
agreements (Spiller, Stein and Tommasi, 2003). In 
the case of  pension policy, this is aggravated by 
a number of  distinguishing factors, since it is an 
explicitly distributive policy, with multiple objectives 
involving opportunity costs between them, and which 
unfold in a time sequence that makes the policy 
unique. Bearing in mind that the transfers involved 
are large, that the entire pension system is essentially 
founded on a type of promise, by organizing claims 
on future social production (Barr, 2002), and that the 
complete duration of the pension-policy cycle is quite 
exceptional, one can infer the decisive importance of 
the political dynamics surrounding it.
In very general terms it can be argued that 
institutional arrangements in Argentina have frequently 
been considered unfavourable and adverse for achieving 
and sustaining cooperative political behaviour, or they 
have been characterized by political actors facing short 
time horizons or inadequate incentives, or both (Spiller, 
Stein and Tommasi, 2003). In contrast, Chile seems 
to have displayed more solid policy-making processes 
since the restoration of democracy, in which changes 
have been incremental and have generally emerged out 
of a relatively intense and institutionalized process. 
In brief, Chile seems to have found policy-making 
dynamics that tend to facilitate cooperative responses 
in the political transaction game.
In terms of pension policy, it can be argued that 
the course of  the recent reforms in Argentina and 
Chile is consistent with this differential diagnostic. 
The recent reforms in fact provide a range of 
circumstances where the capacity to articulate interests 
and inter-temporal political commitment seem to have 
been unequal. Returning to the structural reforms 
implemented in Chile (1980) and the Argentina (1993) 
as a similar starting point for analysing the most 
recent processes, both reforms were presented at the 
time as icons of  broader reform processes. In Chile, 
pension reform was probably the most famous of the 
“modernizations” of the military dictatorship, whereas 
in Argentina, they were a cornerstone of  the move 
to orthodoxy led by the first Menem government. 
Thus, as “icons” the reforms were surrounded by 
a major communication battle between promoters 
and opponents over what came to be called the 
privatization of  retirement pensions.
But in Argentina, the 1993 reform did not 
completely replace the old system. Unlike the Chilean 
system and the one originally proposed by the Argentine 
Government, the law passed by the National Congress 
did not definitively close down the pay-as-you-go 
system, but founded a multi-pillar model. This fact 
seems not to have been trivial: from the very outset of 
the reform and until the present day, under the recent 
“revisionist” spirit that has surrounded it, the general 
debate on the pension system has (almost exclusively) 
been confined to a simplistic dichotomy of “private” 
versus “public”. When that reform was introduced, 
the political authorities explicitly promoted the new 
individual accounts regime as “new” in terms of 
retirement pensions, and encouraged people to join 
it; but there was a glaring absence of a serious and 
objective information strategy targeting workers in 
different situations (Isuani and San Martino, 1995). 
In contrast, for several years, popular discourse 
has veered drastically towards the second of these 
positions; in fact, the key message transmitted by 
the authorities in relation to the recent reforms was 
the idea that workers would regain the chance to 
IV
Notes on the political processes
behind the reforms
103
REfoRmInG ThE PEnSIon REfoRmS: ARGEnTInA And ChILE  •  RAfAEL RofmAn, EdUARdo fAJnzyLbER And GERmán hERRERA
C E P A L  R E V I E W  1 0 1  •  A U G U S T  2 0 1 0
transfer from the “private” to the “public” system; 
and lastly, that reunification under a public pay-as-
you-go scheme would generate improved benefits for 
retirees. In particular, neither then nor now do suitable 
political channels seem to exist, which —transcending 
the superficial and mechanistic debate over that 
false dichotomy— shape a deeper and systematic 
social dialogue that seeks to penetrate the (highly 
complex) dynamics of negotiation and inter-temporal 
cooperation required by any retirement system that 
aims to be efficient, inclusive and sustainable.
In Chile, meanwhile, once in power, the coalition 
governments chose continuity over radical change in 
this as in other public policy areas; and they decided 
to support the reformed pension system. Only minor 
reforms have been made to the system since 1990, 
mainly aimed at altering investment regulations. In 
recent years however, the issue of coverage emerged 
as a key element and has taken centre stage in 
policy debates. As noted above, in March 2006, the 
Government created the Advisory Council on Pension 
Reform, to analyse the evolution of the system, study 
its shortcomings and develop a public hearings process 
lasting 90 days. The Council, consisting of prestigious 
experts in this field, provided an in-depth diagnostic 
assessment and proposed a number of substantive 
reforms. The Government then set up a Ministerial 
Committee to evaluate the Council’s recommendations, 
which finally produced a reform bill which was sent 
to Congress and passed in January 2008. 
In contrast, the most recent reforms of  the 
Argentine system, analysed in detail in section II, arose 
from a closed-door process involving a succession 
of steps (which were not always coordinated) from 
which key pensions stakeholders were excluded, 
where only a few political figures decided the course 
to be followed. As seen above, the moratorium for 
self-employed workers, which ultimately developed 
into an unprecedented mass transfer, proved to be 
one of the most significant reforms to the Argentine 
pension system in recent years. This was built on a 
combination of laws and decrees that led to a massive 
increase in the number of beneficiaries. The institutional 
process underlying this important reform was very 
unusual: for example, the legislative bill that led to 
the most recent amendment which triggered the mass 
of nature of the moratorium, originated in Congress 
and was passed without discussion —in other words 
without any debate by legislators, who voted for the 
bill as it emerged from the commissions. As a result, 
the new law did not attract the attention of the press 
or the political authorities; and, in particular, there 
was also no announcement or formal act to launch 
the initiative. One year later, the programme was 
made operational by a regulatory decree issued in 
November 2008. The subsequent abolition of  the 
individual capitalization component under private 
management, and its replacement by a reunified public 
pay-as-you-go system, were announced as a surprise in 
late October 2008 and became law in December that 
year. The law abolished the capitalization scheme and 
provided that all taxpayers, beneficiaries and assets 
affiliated to it would be transferred to the public pay-
as-you-go system. Once again, debate on the bill in 
Congress was extremely brief, since it received rapid 
support from all political sectors.
It is now possible to discern a reasonably clear 
pattern in recent pension policy in the two countries. 
In keeping with the characteristics of  the systems 
described above, pension reforms have been seen to 
need not only scrupulous technical analysis but also 
a process for collecting and disseminating accurate 
information to gain support and build consensus 
(idb, 2007). In the recent pension reforms, Chile 
seems to have come closer to those standards than 
Argentina, where changes were introduced in a 
disorderly sequence, with little mutual consistency. 
Many of the key announcements came as a complete 
surprise and were rapidly processed through Congress. 
Unlike the Chilean case, the Argentine reforms 
did not involve major efforts to promote broad 
debate and careful examination among the various 
pension-policy stakeholders (direct or indirect). Nor 
was there any consideration or detailed discussion 
of  the present and future fiscal implications of  the 
measures being implemented.
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Argentina and Chile have traditionally been two of 
the region’s social-policy pioneers. Both are among 
a small group of countries that introduced pension 
systems in the early twentieth century; since when 
they have moved forward by providing progressively 
broader coverage to a growing number of workers. 
In 1980, Chile once again took pioneering steps by 
introducing a structural reform which, among other 
important changes, set up a private pension-fund 
management system. A decade later, Argentina followed 
the Chilean model with a number of differences, when 
a traditional pay-as-you-go scheme was transformed 
into a multi-pillar scheme. 
The progress made in adopting reforms has 
continued in recent years, with both countries again 
making significant changes to their systems. These 
clearly share several common objectives, such as the 
expansion of old-age coverage and redefinition of the 
role of the State in facilitating access to the benefits. 
Nonetheless, there are significant differences in other 
respects, including the institutional organization of 
the systems, partly owing to certain different political 
approaches towards the workings of  the previous 
structures, and the implementation of different policy-
making processes in the two countries.
The reforms in Argentina produced an immediate 
increase in coverage, sharply breaking with the 
previous trend. The total number of retirees rose by 
over 70% in two years, following the introduction of a 
moratorium that led to a massive inclusion programme. 
This made it possible for any individual over the 
established retirement age to apply for a pension, 
regardless of his or her past contributions record and 
irrespective of whether he or she was the beneficiary 
of some other type of pension currently in force.25 The 
reforms also meant the annulment of a key part of the 
changes introduced in 1993, by abolishing individual 
capitalization accounts and returning to a unified 
form of operation managed by a public agency, in a 
system that reverted to a defined benefits framework. 
The existence of private pension-fund managers thus 
25  As the programme advanced, a restriction was introduced to 
avoid duplication of benefits, although this did not include limits 
on persons receiving a survivor pension. 
V
Conclusions
ended. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the 
changes did not represent a complete return to the 
pre-1993 situation, since most of the parameters of 
the system (including current contribution rates, 
retirement ages and replacement rates) were not reset 
to their previous levels. Moreover, the public agency 
responsible for managing the new reunified system will 
continue to receive a portion of general tax revenue 
(originally assigned to finance the transition cost). 
Consequently, this agency can be expected to manage 
a growing fund: in 2008 it amounted to over 10% of 
Argentine gdp. Lastly, to this day, there is no official 
estimate of the fiscal impact of the reforms, in either 
the short or medium terms. 
In Chile, meanwhile, most of the reforms will 
produce their effects gradually through time. The 
beneficiaries of the new solidarity pillar will be few 
at first, but their number will gradually increase as 
the system is implemented. Clearly, this is the main 
novelty of the recent reforms, since they will lead to a 
universal coverage system in the near future. Another 
set of reforms affect operational aspects of the existing 
system and the institutional structure of government 
supervision and oversight agencies. Moreover, a number 
of changes aimed to eliminate systemic inequities, such 
as those relating to gender differences.
The process of designing and approving these 
reforms was very different in the two countries, 
reflecting different current institutional contexts. In 
Chile the process began when President Bachelet 
announced her intention to reform the system and 
appointed a Council of  Experts. Two years later, 
following various debates, publications and analyses, 
the reform was approved. In Argentina, most of 
the decisions were made very quickly at the top 
government decision-making level, with a very brief  
and limited consultation and discussion process. 
These differences may help explain differences in the 
results and, therefore, deserve more detailed study 
and analysis in the future. 
The more cautious and careful approach taken 
by the Chilean authorities in introducing pension 
reforms will probably help achieve more sustainable 
results through time. Nonetheless, the execution of a 
more rapid reform in Argentina managed to give an 
immediate response to the major problem of the massive 
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decrease in coverage. Most older adults excluded 
from the system were receiving a pension within a 
year, thereby achieving an immediate improvement 
in relation to their previous situation. In Chile, by 
contrast, the process that means covering all registered 
beneficiaries will be slower and more gradual.
Clearly, neither of the two systems has attained a 
position or a design that could be seen as “definitive”; 
and policy challenges remain to be addressed by the 
authorities in the near future. New problems and 
difficulties will also inevitably arise. The ability of 
future Governments to respond adequately to these 
problems will be decisive for the well-being of future 
generations of Chilean and Argentine people.
(Original: Spanish)
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